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THE SCOPE OF INTERDISCIPLINARY
COLLABORATION
HAROLD KAPLAN*

There seem to be three separate questions out on the table. I'm not sure
which one to charge at first. I take it the main interest at this Conference has
been the question of whether people in the social sciences should be
asked to come over to this building. The second question, which perhaps
interests me a bit more, is whether we should come, if invited. That is, what
possibly we could get out of the experience. And then, thirdly, there is
Professor Mohr's very eloquent existentialist critique of modem social science.
Perhaps I can make my position known very briefly by beginning with the last
point and then working back to the first two.
In case any of you are undecided about the matter let me reassure you
immediately that Professor Mohr is wrong, almost from the beginning. I
don't know if I need say anything beyond that. Obviously this sounds
authoritative enough. These are, of course, very fundamental, philosophic
questions and I don't suppose that one can do them justice in a few minutes.
Of course, scientific knowledge involves a partial view. That's really
what science is - the development of a number of different partial views.
There seems to me to be nothing wrong with this as long as one avoids
this other mistake that Professor Mohr referred to, namely, assuming that
one's partial view is the real thing.
What I've never been able to understand in listening to Professor Mohr
and his crowd is the relationship between two statements they always make.
One statement introduces radicial skepticism into all of our experiences. How
do we know that the things we are sensing about an object correspond to the
reality of the object. I think that this is the kind of radical skepticism that
science shares. This skepticism would turn one's attention to broad problems of
epistemology and methods of knowing. The second proposition that Professor
Mohr and his cohorts reiterate is that our knowing of the thing should be
guided by the thing itself. I'll be damned if I can jump from one statement to
the other. I've seen these two statements juxtaposed often enough. But if we
are to be radically skeptical about the very process of knowing, how are we to
organize our knowledge on the basis of the thing itself. They tell us that we
are to let the thing itself guide us; but they don't tell us what the thing is and
how we're to know what it is. I really think that scientists begin with an
essentially phenomenological assumption, namely, that all knowing is partial
knowing. Now, you don't know a situation, you know things about it; and
you make the best with what you know.
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As for this other business about the social scientists being guilty of bad
faith and selling out on their social obligations, I can only say that this is a
point that Max Weber and Emile Durkhiem would have understood very well
since those two developed the concept of functional differentiation. Surely,
Professor Mohr is aware of the notion that individuals play a variety of roles.
I've never been able to understand why so many existentialists and existentialist psychiatrists think that the psychiatrist/client relationship should be
extended to all relationships, that somehow there is to be only one role that all
people play, and that, if a scientist tries to play a more specific role he is
selling out on all the other roles.
There is a qualitative difference between pure knowledge and applied
knowledge. Pure knowledge is an attempt to build up some systematic but partial knowledge; it seems to me that applied science is an attempt to bring to
bear these partial systems of knowledge on a concrete problem. This distinction
between pure and applied is relevant to the question of interdisciplinary
collaboration. In my view, there are two kinds of interdisciplinary collaborations. You can have a group of so-called pure scientists come together and
be interested in gaining something from the other person's theoretical perspective or methods of knowing. Out of this, perhaps, will come some further
refinement in their own separate disciplines. There might even be some fusion
of disciplines. Perhaps a new discipline would be created out of this. The
other kind of collaboration occurs when a group of pure scientists come
together and contribute what they can to a concrete problem. It seems to me
that urban studies programmes and urban studies centres involve collaboration
of the latter kind.
The urban area is simply a locale in which a number of things occur.
When one creates an urban studies centre, one is simply asking a number of
different disciplines to come and say what they have to say about urban
phenomena. The end product of this kind of collaboration, I would
think, would be some kind of programme for reform or change. It doesn't
seem to me that you can produce a new discipline called urban studies. I don't
believe there is any such thing as a science of urban affairs. I've seen the
phrase environmental science and I don't think there's any such thing as that
either. In effect, the constituent disciplines bring what they have but each
discipline remains largely the same. It seems to me that the constituent
disciplines rarely achieve much from this kind of collaboration. A psychologist bringing what he knows about urban life to a forum on urban problems
may contribute something; but I don't think he'll come back feeling he knows
more about the psychology or urban life. Perhaps concrete solutions, which
would improve the quality of urban life, might come out of this collaboration.
But, in terms of basic principles, each discipline goes back to its home base
relatively untouched.
The last basic problem that seems to be raised here might be phrased in
this way: can science save us? If we call a bunch of scientists together to
consider a moral/social problem are we going to come up with any better
answers than we would if we were to collect 500 plumbers in one room and
have them go at some of the moral and social problems of the day. This again,
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of course, is a common and much debated problem in the philosophy of
social science. In my view we cannot go from statements of fact to moral
conclusions. To ask the scientist to come up with moral answers is to demand
of science what it cannot do. It's quite true that sometimes scientists play
the expertise game and try to convince you that their expertise makes them
better at moral judgments. But this is a shell game, and I think it ought to be
unmasked. The scientist can perhaps contribute to more informed moral
choices, but he cannot produce moral conclusions without nonscientific, moral
premises lurking somewhere in his argument.
Finally, what is the relationship between the scientist and the practioner? Can the practitioner benefit from what the social scientist has to
offer? This, I think, depends on what the practitioner wants to know. In many
cases, I would assume that the practitioner's knowledge is better for the kind
of problem he's dealing with. But I would hesitate to agree with the view
that common sense, everyday knowledge is always superior to the rigourous,
partial images that emerge in the social sciences.

